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The Significance of the Second Reduction to Absurdity in Mahā-
vibhāṣā Criticizing the Self-cognition Theory of Mahāsāṅghika 
TOBITA Yasuhiro 
The objective of this paper is to clarify the significance of the second reduction to absurdity, 
reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) in Mahāvibhāṣā (『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』) that criticizes the 
self-cognition theory of Mahāsāṅghika by the Sarvāstivādin. Mahāsāṅghika propounds that recognition 
(*jñāna) works in the way that it recognizes the recognition itself (*svātman) concurrently with 
recognizing any other things (*parātman), both of which are not eternal self (*anātman). Sarvāstivādin, 
on the other hand, denies that recognition recognizes the recognition itself. Here, Sarvāstivādin 
constructs five specific kinds of reduction to absurdity to refute Mahāsāṅghika. However, it appears 
that in the second kind of reduction to absurdity, Sarvāstivādin arbitrarily places limitation on the 
object (artha) and the feature (ākāra) of recognition contained in the theory propounded by Mahā-
sāṅghika. To be concrete, despite the intention of Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivādin appears to understand 
perversely that Mahāsāṅghika propounds that recognition recognizes only recognition itself by only its 
original feature (svalakṣaṇa) of “recognition itself.” Then, why did Sarvāstivādin arbitrarily place 
limitation on the object and the feature of recognition in the theory by Mahāsāṅghika?   
In order to clarify this issue, this paper analyzes this reduction to absurdity by means of 
comparison with the similar argumentation in Vijñānakaya (『阿毘達磨識身足論』), which allegedly 
triggered off self-cognition theory. 
Although this second kind of reduction to absurdity was constituted against the specific 
self-cognition theory in the context of Vijñānakaya, in later years, this context was forgotten and put 
into the context of the general criticism of Mahāvibhāṣā. As a result, it was identified that, in order to 
constitute reduction to absurdity in the general context, Sarvāstivādin had to place limitation on the 
object and the feature of recognition in the theory by Mahāsāṅghika. 
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